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Abstract
We present new evidence about the relationship between military conflict and city
population growth in Europe from the fall of Charlemagne’s empire to the start of
the Industrial Revolution. Military conflict was a main feature of European history.
We argue that cities were safe harbors from conflict threats. To test this argument,
we construct a novel database that geocodes the locations of more than 800 conflicts
between 800 and 1799. We find a significant, positive, and robust relationship that
runs from conflict exposure to city population growth. Our analysis suggests that
military conflict played a key role in the rise of urban Europe.
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The economic rise of Europe is a watershed historical event. Many scholars argue that
cities played a central role in this rise (e.g., Smith, 1776, Weber, 1922, Pirenne, 1925, Mum-
ford, 1960, Bairoch, 1988, Hohenberg and Lees, 1995, Glaeser, 2011). One thousand years
ago, the urbanization rate in Europe was less than 4 percent. Even Rome was only 5 to
10 percent of its size under the Roman Empire. By the start of the Industrial Revolution,
however, Europe had become highly urbanized (van Bavel et al., 2013, p. 392, 394).
What explains Europe’s dramatic urban growth? This paper analyzes a main feature
of European history: military conflict. According to Tilly (1992, p. 72), early modern
Europe was at war in 78 to 95 percent of all years. In this context, historical cities were
“safe harbors” from conflict threats (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002). Historical cities held key
defensive advantages over rural areas (e.g., fortifications). In the words of Adam Smith
(1776, p. 250): “The inhabitants of cities and burghs, considered as single individuals,
had no power to defend themselves; but by entering into a league of mutual defence with
their neighbours, they were capable of making no contemptible resistance.” We argue
that, to escape the destructive effects of warfare, rural inhabitants under the threat of
conflict relocated to cities. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first city-level
analysis of the relationship between military conflict and urban growth.
To test this argument, we construct a novel database that spans the fall of Charle-
magne’s empire to the start of the Industrial Revolution. We identify the geographic
locations of all conflicts fought on land in Europe from 800 to 1799. In total, our data
include more than 800 conflicts and nearly 700 cities. To measure city exposure to conflict
threats, we geocode conflict and city locations at the local (grid cell) level. The results of
our econometric analysis show a positive and significant relationship that runs from con-
flict exposure to city population growth. We find that conflict exposure was associated
with a 6-11 percent average increase in city populations per century. To put such mag-
nitudes into perspective, average per-century city population growth between 800 and
1800 was 22 percent. Our most conservative estimate thus suggests that conflict-related
city population growth was responsible for roughly one-quarter of average per-century
city population growth over this period.
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We show evidence that this relationship is robust. Our benchmark model accounts
for time-invariant local characteristics and widespread shocks through fixed effects. To
further address the possibility of omitted variable bias, we modify the benchmark model
to include country-century interaction effects, which help account for the evolution of
country-level features (e.g., nation-state building), and grid-cell specific time trends, which
help account for unobservable time-varying local features (e.g., rural-urban wage differ-
ences). In addition, we interact century fixed effects with observable time-invariant local
characteristics (e.g., Atlantic trade potential) that may influence city population trends.
Finally, we control for city-level observable features including urban networks and polit-
ical, educational, and religious characteristics.
Larger cities may be more attractive targets for attackers. Country-century interaction
effects and grid-cell specific trends help account for demographic trends at the national
and local levels, respectively. To further address the possibility of reverse causation from
urban size to conflict exposure, we control for pre-existing trends and mean reversion
effects by interacting initial city populations with century fixed effects. In addition, we
perform placebo tests and other tests for reverse causation. Such tests provide further
evidence that the direction of causation runs from conflict exposure to city population
growth and not vice versa.
To complete our analysis of the safe harbor effect, we present evidence on conflict
types and on city walls.
Our paper contributes to the literature on the historical origins of state capacity. War-
fare is a prominent explanation for nation-state formation in Europe (Tilly, 1975, 1992,
Mann, 1986, Brewer, 1989, Downing, 1992, Besley and Persson, 2009, Gennaioli and Voth,
2014). Tilly’s (1975, p. 42) famous statement is: “War made the state, and the state made
war.” According to the standard account, governments made institutional reforms that
enabled them to finance military efforts and defend against survival threats. What this
literature tends to overlook, however, is that institutional innovations at the city level
were often historical precursors to state-level innovations (Stasavage, 2011, Blaydes and
Paik, 2015). Our results show that before “war made the state,” war helped “make the
city” by driving rural inhabitants under the threat of conflict to relocate behind urban
fortifications. In this way, our results improve our understanding of the state formation
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process.
In a related manner, our paper contributes to the literature on the historical origins
of economic development. Scholars have linked historical warfare and state formation
with modern prosperity (Bates, 2010, O’Brien, 2011, Rosenthal and Wong, 2011, Dincecco
and Prado, 2012, Voigtla¨nder and Voth, 2013a,b). As described, our results show that
warfare helps explain the historical transformation from countryside to city. Urban den-
sity facilitates economic activity by reducing the costs of exchange for goods, labor, and
ideas (Glaeser, 2011). Our results imply that warfare promoted historical development
by driving rural inhabitants into cities where they could take advantage of agglomera-
tion economies. In this regard, our paper offers a new way to understand the economic
rise of urban Europe.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section develops our argument. Section 3 de-
scribes the database and measurement. Section 4 presents the econometric methodology
and the main results. Sections 5 tests for robustness. Section 6 presents further evidence.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
This section performs two tasks. First, we discuss the relationship between military con-
flict and city population growth in European history, with a focus on the safe harbor ef-
fect. Second, we describe factors beyond military conflict that may help explain historical
urbanization.
2.1 Military Conflict and City Growth
2.1.1 Safe Harbor Effect
Scholars trace urbanization in medieval Europe to the ninth-century break-up of Charle-
magne’s empire (Rosenthal and Wong, 2011, Stasavage, 2011).1 The number of indepen-
1City founding years often long preceded the fall of Charlemagne’s empire. Boone (2013, p. 221) writes:
“Broaching the subject of the origins of medieval urban Europe may wrongly suggest that the city was a
totally new phenomenon in European history. In fact, in many cases medieval urbanity was built on a solid
urban tradition, at least in those parts of Europe heavily influenced by the Roman Empire or Romanitas.”
After the fall of the Roman Empire, urban centers typically saw decay, but did not typically disappear
(Boone, 2013, p. 222). In addition, new cities were founded during the medieval era throughout Europe
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dent states in Europe grew from less than 10 in 800 to more than 200 by 1300 (van Zanden,
2009, p. 33). Political fragmentation created instability and warfare, which van Zanden
(2009, p. 34) describes as follows: “This decentralization of political power often resulted
in continuous warfare among the local lords, but at the same time led to an intensification
of power at the local level.”
Urban fortifications enabled rural populations to escape from some of the most de-
structive effects of medieval warfare (Smith, 1776, Pirenne, 1925, Mumford, 1960, Hohen-
berg and Lees, 1995, Rosenthal and Wong, 2011). Glaeser and Shapiro (2002, p. 208) write:
The first, and probably most important, interaction between warfare and ur-
ban development is that historically cities have provided protection against
land-based attackers. Cities have the dual advantages of large numbers and
walls and thus, holding the size of the attack constant, it is much better to be
in a city than alone in the hinterland. Indeed, the role of cities in protecting
their residents against outside attackers is one of the main reasons why many
cities developed over time.
Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) call this effect the “safe harbor effect.” In medieval Eu-
rope, scale advantage was key to military victory (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002). Urban
fortifications – including outer rings of conjoined dwellings, defensive palisades or ram-
parts, and fortified walls – were difficult to break through or surmount, enabling small
groups of defenders to fend off even large groups of attackers (Tracy, 2000b). Mumford
(1960, p. 250) states: “Against sudden raids a wall, on guard at all hours, was more useful
than any amount of military courage.” Furthermore, urban fortifications engendered a
scale economy. As city size increased, there was a sharp drop in the required amount of
fortifications per person (Glaeser and Shapiro, 2002).
Military campaigns could inflict numerous costs on rural populations. There was
manpower losses in the fields, first because peasants were war recruits and second due
to campaign-related deaths (Gutmann, 1980, p. 75). Crops, farms, and homes were de-
stroyed due to arson. Peasants were responsible for large tax burdens during conflicts
and for repair costs for damages to physical infrastructure (Caferro, 2008, p. 187). Since
including Central Europe (Livi-Bacci, 2000, p. 21-7).
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peasants had to billet soldiers, peacetime preparations for future campaigns were costly
(Hale, 1985, p. 197). Hale (1985, p. 196) writes: “In terms of personal impact the burdens
of war certainly afflicted the rural more than the urban population.” Thus, to escape the
most destructive effects of warfare, we may expect to observe rural inhabitants under the
threat of conflict to relocate to cities.2
2.1.2 Target Effect
The safe harbor effect implies that there should be a positive relationship that runs from
military conflict to city population growth. Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) also identify a
“target effect” whereby larger cities were more attractive targets for attackers. Since ur-
ban density facilitates plunder, attackers will prefer large urban concentrations, ceteris
paribus. According to this argument, the logic runs from city population size to military
conflict (the opposite of the safe harbor effect). Furthermore, if a city did not possess the
military might to protect its wealth, then the target effect may have led to urban destruc-
tion. In that case, we may expect to observe a negative relationship between military
conflict and city population growth. Our econometric analysis ahead will account for the
target effect.
2.1.3 Other Effects
Beyond the safe harbor effect, there are at least two other effects that may generate a pos-
itive relationship that runs from military conflict to city population growth. First, Hen-
derson et al. (2015) identify a “rural poverty effect” in modern-day Sub-Saharan Africa
whereby dry agricultural conditions induce rural inhabitants to migrate to cities in search
of better economic opportunities. Similarly, in the context of European history, the de-
structive effects of warfare in the countryside may have promoted rural-urban migration.
What distinguishes the safe harbor effect from the rural poverty effect is that the former
effect is anticipatory (it should occur under the threat of conflict) whereas the latter ef-
fect is reactionary (it should occur in the aftermath of conflict). Second, Voigtla¨nder and
2Anecdotes highlight the historical role of cities as safe harbors beyond Europe. For example, Reid (2012,
pp. 3-4) writes about Sub-Saharan Africa: “Elsewhere, warfare has been one of the drivers of urbanization,
especially in the Western half of the continent; in some areas, the roots of urbanization lie in itinerant royal
camps comprising armies and their enormous entourages, whereas in other circumstances, communities
have come together in fortified urban clusters for protection, a phenomenon associated particularly with the
nineteenth century – among the Yoruba, for example, or the Nyamwezi.” [Our italics]
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Voth (2013a,b) identify a “Malthusian effect” (also see Galor and Weil, 2000) in which a
large shock (the Black Death of 1348-50) reduced the rural population and thereby in-
creased rural wages (where a fixed amount of land is an important factor of production).
Higher wages increased the demand for manufactures produced in cities, which in turn
promoted urbanization. We will provide specific evidence for the safe harbor effect in
Section 6. However, we will not be able to rule out the role of the rural poverty effect or
the Malthusian effect.
2.2 Alternative Explanations
Beyond military conflict, scholars highlight other factors that may help explain historical
urbanization.
Initial conditions are one such factor. Rokkan (1975) argues that key river trade routes
led to early urban growth. Tilly (1992) emphasizes early commercial activities. Abramson
and Boix (2014) argue that urban clusters were most likely to form in productive agricul-
tural zones. White (1962) and Andersen et al. (2015) relate the adoption of the heavy plow
to greater urbanization in zones with clay soils. Motamed et al. (2014) find that a loca-
tion’s agricultural potential and transport costs influence the likelihood of urbanization.
By contrast, Bleakley and Lin (2015) argue that locational fundamentals are not the only
determinants of city sizes.
Another strand of literature highlights political factors. De Long and Shleifer (1993),
Acemoglu et al. (2005), and van Zanden et al. (2012) link representative government,
which they argue protected private property rights, with greater urbanization. However,
Stasavage (2014) argues that, due to their oligarchic structures, self-governing cities had
negative long-run consequences for urbanization.
Other scholars focus on human and social capital. Dittmar (2011) shows evidence that
urbanization was fastest where the moveable type printing press, which promoted new
merchant skills, was adopted. Using city-level data, Cantoni and Yuchtman (2014) find
that university training improved legal infrastructure and reduced trade costs. Greif and
Tabellini (2010) argue that weak kin relations led to urban growth as a way to facilitate
wide-scale cooperation. Guiso et al. (2008) show evidence that the medieval establish-
ment of free cities had consequences for the development of social capital.
7
Nunn and Qian (2011) highlight the seventeen-century introduction of the potato to
the Old World, which can improve agricultural productivity and increase the returns to
urban manufacturing. Furthermore, the potato’s positive productivity shock can increase
per capita income, which is positively linked with urbanization. Iyigun et al. (2010) show
that there is a negative relationship between the introduction of the potato and violent
conflict in Old World regions that were suitable to potato cultivation.
Our econometric analysis ahead will account for these sorts of economic, geographic,
political, and social factors.
3 Data
Our urban population data are from Bairoch et al. (1988), who provide city population
data for all European cities that ever reached 5,000 inhabitants between 800 and 1800 at
century intervals for 800 to 1700 and half-century intervals for 1750 to 1850.3 To help
maintain estimation intervals of equal lengths, we focus our analysis on century (rather
than the half-century) intervals.4 Our city population sample runs from 900, just after the
ninth-century fall of Charlemagne’s empire, to 1800, just before the start of the Industrial
Revolution in Continental Europe.5 We linearly interpolate (but never extrapolate) miss-
ing observations. To account for city-level features, we merge the Bairoch et al. data with
data from Bosker et al. (2013), which leaves us with an unbalanced panel of 676 cities.6
3Thus, we use all available population data, including for cities with less than 5,000 inhabitants at some
point in time. Table A2 of the online appendix shows the result for the most stringent specification (i.e.,
column 4 of Table 3) when we (i) exclude cities that never reached 10,000 inhabitants and (ii) only include
city-century observations for city populations greater than or equal to 10,000. For (i), the estimate for
Ci,g,t−1 is 0.067, with p-value 0.031. For (ii), the estimate for Ci,g,t−1 is 0.063, with p-value 0.057 (we lose
nearly 40 percent of observations). Table A9 of the online appendix shows the result for the most stringent
specification when we normalize per-century city populations according to Black and Henderson (1999).
The estimate for Ci,g,t−1 is 0.092, with p-value 0.020.
4The Bairoch et al. data do not include 1100. Thus, we interpolate (but never extrapolate) observations for
1100. de Vries (1984) is an alternative data source for European historical urban populations. However,
the de Vries data do not start until 1500. Bosker et al. (2013) compare the Bairoch et al. and de Vries data
for each century from 1500 to 1800. They find very similar estimates for urban populations; the correlation
coefficients range between 0.986 and 0.992.
5The nature of warfare changed dramatically over the nineteenth century due to improvements in transport
and communications technologies and the rise of the mass army (Onorato et al., 2014).
6We updated the urban population data according to Bosker et al. (2013) for Bruges, Cordoba, London,
Palermo, and Paris.
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Our historical conflict data are from Bradbury (2004) and Clodfelter (2002).7 Bradbury
(2004) provides data on all military conflicts in the medieval West. The Bradbury data
are organized into chapters, each of which covers a different geographical area of me-
dieval warfare. Within each chapter, there is a summary of each military conflict fought,
including a description of the conflict’s location, approximate date, and type. The Brad-
bury data end in 1525. We use the Bradbury data for military conflicts over 800-1499. The
Clodfelter data start in 1500; we use these data for military conflicts over 1500-1799. The
Clodfelter data are organized into chapters by century and geographical area. We focus
on military conflicts fought in Europe.
The historical conflict data may be subject to measurement error. Even if Bradbury and
Clodfelter are unable to record all conflicts, however, it is likely that they include the most
important conflicts as documented by historians. Still, the quality of data documentation
may differ by place. To help account for local differences in data quality, our econometric
analysis ahead will always include city fixed effects.
Our unit of analysis for military conflict is an individual conflict (e.g., battle, siege),
which could be a one-off event or part of a larger war. The Bradbury data categorize
military conflicts as individual conflicts. However, the Clodfelter data categorize mili-
tary conflicts under war headings. Each war heading has an entry of several paragraphs
that describe the war’s details. To identify the locations of the individual conflicts that
comprise each war, we read through each entry in Clodfelter and compiled a list of all
individual conflicts. Table 1 displays an example using the Thirty Years’ War (1618-48),
which by our reading contains 37 individual conflicts.
Historical accounts cannot pinpoint the exact geographical locations of military con-
flicts. We thus approximate conflict locations by the settlement (i.e., hamlet, village, town,
city) nearest to where they took place. This method is both feasible, given the lack of avail-
able historical information, and intuitive, because conflicts were typically named after
nearby settlements. For example, according to the Bradbury data, the Battle of Mons-en-
Pe´ve`le was fought on July 18, 1304 between Philip IV of France and William of Ju¨lich of
Flanders. This battle took place near the commune of Mons-en-Pe´ve`le in northern France.
7Tilly (1992) and Jaques (2007) are two other sources for historical conflict data, both of which support the
argument that military conflict was a defining feature of European history.
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We thus assign the geographical coordinates of Mons-en-Pe´ve`le to it (50◦ 28’ 49” N, 3◦ 6’
11” E).
Table 2 summarizes the historical conflict data. Military conflict was a key feature of
European history: 847 land-based conflicts took place from 800 to 1799, for an average of
85 per century. The tenth century saw the least conflict, with 15 recorded conflicts, while
the eighteenth century saw the most, with 295. Breaking the data down by modern-day
countries, France saw the most conflict over this period, at 165, followed by Italy (135),
England (103), Germany (103), and the Low Countries of Belgium and the Netherlands
(66).
To measure city exposure to military conflicts, we use 150 km x 150 km grid-scale
cells.8 This size of grid cell roughly corresponds with NUTS2 units (e.g., county, province,
region), the basic unit of economic territory devised by Eurostat, the statistical office of
the European Union. To provide a sense of perspective, the Tuscany region in the center-
north of Italy is roughly 150 km x 150 km. Florence, the capital of Tuscany, is located
near the center of this region. The distance from Florence to Livorno, the region’s main
port on the Tyrrhenian Sea, is roughly 90 kilometers as the crow flies. Reyerson (1999)
claims that fourteenth-century horseback travel in Italy could cover 50 kilometers per
day.9 Thus, we estimate that the historical travel time by horseback between Florence
and Livorno was less than two days. Another example is the distance from Siena, also
located near the center of Tuscany, to Grosseto, a southern Tuscan port. This distance is
roughly 77 kilometers as the crow flies. Thus, we believe that 150 km x 150 km grid sizes
are appropriate.10
We only include 150 km x 150 km grid cells that fall (at least partially) within the
borders of modern countries for which there is at least one sample city. 196 grid cells
8We use a cylindrical equal area map projection with geometric center (longitude, latitude)=(10.00735,
46.76396), near Davos, Switzerland. Figure 1 displays data in the projection of analysis.
9Reyerson (1999) claims that medieval horseback travel from Paris to the Mediterranean coast, a distance
of approximately 750 kilometers, took 12 days. At a rate of 50 kilometers per day, this trip would take
15 days. This duration is roughly in line with Reyerson’s claim about medieval horseback travel time for
Italy.
10Table A8 of the online appendix shows the results for the fixed effects specification (i.e., column 1 of Table
3) and the most stringent specification (i.e., column 4 of Table 3) when we use 75 km x 75 km grid cells. For
the fixed effects specification, the estimate for Ci,g,t−1 is 0.153, with p-value 0.002. For the most stringent
specification, the estimate for Ci,g,t−1 is 0.049, with p-value 0.095.
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include at least one sample city. 95 percent of total conflicts between 800 and 1799 fall
within a grid cell that contains at least one sample city. To put it differently, only 5 percent
of conflicts do not fall within a grid cell that contains at least one sample city. These
conflicts are rather distant from any sample city (e.g., they are located in Ukraine, Finland,
Norway, or Sweden).
90 percent of grid cell-centuries saw 0 or 1 conflicts from 800 to 1799. Thus, in line with
the approach taken by Besley and Reynal-Querol (2014), we construct a dummy variable
for each grid cell that equals 1 if there was (at least one) military conflict in that cell for
each century from 800 to 1799, and 0 otherwise.11 This approach reduces the influence of
unobservable factors that can affect the total number of conflicts to which sample cities
were exposed. 95 percent of grid cell-centuries saw 0, 1, or 2 conflicts from 800 to 1799.
Thus, as an alternative, we construct an ordered variable for conflict exposure that assigns
a value of 0 to each century that a grid cell saw peace, a value of 1 to one conflict, and a
value of 2 to two or more conflicts.
Figure 1 maps the 847 conflicts (circles) between 800 and 1799 along with the 676 cities
(triangles) that we will exploit in this analysis.
4 Econometric Analysis
4.1 Methodology
The linear specification that we estimate is
Pi,g,t = α+ βCi,g,t−1 + µi + λt + γ′Xi,g,t + ei,g,t, (1)
where Pi,g,t is log population for city i in grid cell g at century t, Ci,g,t−1 is the conflict
dummy that equals 1 if there was a military conflict in grid cell g over the previous cen-
tury, µi and λt are city and century fixed effects, Xi,g,t is a vector of city-level controls
that we will include in a robustness check, and ei,g,t is a random error term.12 All stan-
11Table 2 shows the shares of sample cities and grid cells that saw (at least one) conflict by century. On
average, 27 percent of cities and 19 percent of grid cells saw conflict over 800-1799. The smallest share
of cities saw conflict over the tenth century (9 percent), while the largest share saw conflict over the
eighteenth century (54 percent). Similarly, the smallest share of grid cells saw conflict over the tenth
century (6 percent), while the largest share saw conflict over the eighteenth century (43 percent).
12Thus, the first observation of Pi,g,t is for 900, because the first observation of Ci,g,t−1 measures conflict
exposure over 800-99.
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dard errors are robust, clustered at the grid cell level to account for any within-grid serial
correlation in the error term.13 Table A1 of the online appendix displays the descriptive
statistics for the regression variables.
Our benchmark modeling approach accounts for unobserved features that may influ-
ence city population growth and conflict exposure alike. City fixed effects help account
for initial conditions and time-invariant characteristics. Century fixed effects help account
for widespread shocks. However, methodological challenges remain.
A first concern is omitted variable bias. There may be unobserved time-varying factors
that influence city population growth. We address this concern in several ways. First, we
modify our benchmark model to include country-century interaction effects, which help
account for changes in country-level variables, including total populations, urbanization
rates, economic activity, and nation-state building. Second, we include grid cell-specific
time trends, which help account for unobservable local features that change over time,
including rural-urban wage differences and urban amenities. Third, we interact century
fixed effects with a variety of observable time-invariant city characteristics, including At-
lantic trade potential, soil quality, terrain ruggedness, and potato cultivation. Fourth,
we control for observable time-varying city features, including urban networks, political
institutions, university hosts, and bishop or archbishop seats.
A second concern is reverse causation. As described, Glaeser and Shapiro (2002) iden-
tify a target effect whereby larger cities may be more attractive targets. We address this
concern as follows. First, country-century interaction effects and grid-cell specific trends
control for demographic trends at the national and local levels, respectively. Second, to
further account for pre-existing trends and mean reversion effects, we include initial log
city population-century interaction effects.14 Third, we perform placebo tests equal to the
first lead of our variable of interest. Fourth, we regress (future) conflicts on lagged city
populations.
13Table A15 of the online appendix shows the results when we adjust standard errors for spatial correlation
according to Conley (1999) for the most stringent specification (i.e., column 4 of Table 3). To compute
spatial correlation-adjusted standard errors, we follow the routine in Fetzer (2014), who extends Hsiang
(2010). We assume that spatial correlation linearly decreases in the distance between each sample city
up to cutoffs of 100 km, 200 km, 300 km, 400 km, or 500 km, respectively. The estimates for Ci,g,t−1 are
unchanged, with p-values that range from 0.003 to 0.004.
14Initial log city populations refer to the first available observation for each sample city.
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4.2 Main Results
Table 3 presents our estimates for the relationship between conflict exposure and city
population growth. City fixed effects help account for initial conditions (economic, de-
mographic, political, social) and local geographical features that may influence conflict
patterns. Century fixed effects help control for common shocks across time. Column 1
shows the results for this benchmark specification. There is a significant relationship (at
the 1 percent level) between military conflicts that took place within the same 150 km x
150 km grid cell in which a city was located and city populations. Conflict exposure was
associated with a 11 percent average increase in city populations.
City and century fixed effects help account for unobserved features that were constant
for each city and across each century. To account for changes over time in country-level
variables, column 2 adds country-century interaction effects. The estimate for conflict
exposure is similar in magnitude and significance as the benchmark case. To control for
unobserved factors that may have had time-varying local consequences for urbanization
patterns (e.g., the Black Death), column 3 adds grid cell-specific time trends. The result
for conflict exposure remains significant; the point estimate falls to 6 percent.15
City fixed effects help control for initial demographic conditions. Country-century
interaction effects and grid-cell specific trends help control for national and local demo-
graphic trends, respectively. Still, it is possible that cities with larger or smaller initial
populations grew at different rates. To control for pre-existing trends and mean reversion
effects, column 4 adds initial log city population-century interaction effects. Including
initial log city population-century interaction effects is a demanding way to account for
pre-existing trends and mean reversion effects (Acemoglu et al., 2011). The estimate for
Ci,g,t−1 is significant at the 5 percent level, with a point estimate of 7 percent.
15Table A3 of the online appendix shows the result for the most stringent specification (i.e., column 4 of
Table 3) when we add city-specific time trends (rather than grid cell-specific time trends). The estimate
for Ci,g,t−1 is 0.044, with p-value 0.083 (standard errors clustered at city level) or p-value 0.147 (standard
errors clustered at grid-cell level). Given that our dependent variable Pi,g,t is in logs, the grid cell-specific
(or city-specific) time trends capture exponential trends (Wooldridge, 2009, p. 361). Still, Table A3 of
the online appendix shows the results for the most stringent specification when we add a quadratic time
trend at the city level or grid-cell level. For the former, the estimate for Ci,g,t−1 is 0.039, with p-value 0.139
(standard errors clustered at city level) or p-value 0.208 (standard errors clustered at grid-cell level). For
the latter, the estimate for Ci,g,t−1 is 0.038, with p-value 0.165.
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Overall, Table 3 shows evidence for a significant relationship that runs from conflict
exposure to city population growth in Europe from the fall of Charlemagne’s empire to
the start of the Industrial Revolution. The results are robust to a variety of checks for
omitted variable bias and reverse causation.
5 Robustness
The evidence that we have shown in the previous section supports the argument that
cities were safe harbors in European history. In this section, we use a variety of techniques
to further test the robustness of our results. First, we control for a range of observable
city characteristics that may have influenced city population trends. Second, we perform
placebo tests and other tests for a target effect. Finally, we assess how robust our estimates
are to sample changes and an alternative conflict exposure measure.
5.1 Controls for Observables
5.1.1 Atlantic Trade
Acemoglu et al. (2005) show evidence that Atlantic traders (Britain, France, the Nether-
lands, Portugal, Spain) saw significantly faster urbanization rates from 1500 onward. To
account for the rise of Atlantic trade on city population growth, column 1 of Table 4 in-
teracts Atlantic port cities with century dummies in the most stringent specification (i.e.,
column 4 of Table 3). The result for conflict exposure is robust to the inclusion of Atlantic
port city-century interaction effects, with a point estimate of 7 percent.16
5.1.2 Heavy Plow
White (1962) and Andersen et al. (2015) argue that the breakthrough adoption of the
heavy plow in 1000 led to greater urbanization in European regions with clay soils. To
16Given network effects, Atlantic trade may have been important for cities near, but not along, the Atlantic
coast. Table A7 of the online appendix shows the result that interacts Atlantic coast grid cells with century
fixed effects for the most stringent specification (i.e, column 4 of Table 3). The estimate for Ci,g,t−1 is 0.049,
with p-value 0.076. This table also shows the result for Atlantic coast grid cells and neighboring grid cells.
The estimate for Ci,g,t−1 is very similar as before. To account for Hanseatic trade, we code Hanseatic cities
according to the list in Dollinger (1964, pp. ix-x). Table A7 of the online appendix shows the results that
interact Hanseatic cities or Hanseatic grid cells with century fixed effects. The estimates for Ci,g,t−1 range
from 0.068 to 0.069, with p-values that range from 0.027 to 0.029.
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control for technological changes in agriculture on city population growth, column 2 of
Table 4 interacts local soil quality according to Bosker et al. (2013) with century dummies.
The soil quality data use climate information to calculate the probability that a region can
be cultivated.17 The estimate for Ci,g,t−1 is similar in magnitude and significance to the
previous specification.18
5.1.3 Potato Cultivation
Nunn and Qian (2011) show that the introduction of the potato can account for a signifi-
cant portion of urbanization in the Old World between 1700 and 1900. Similarly, Iyigun et
al. (2010) find a negative relationship between the introduction of the potato and violent
conflict in regions suitable to its cultivation. In the context of China, Jia (2014) shows that
the introduction of the potato reduced the likelihood of peasant revolt in drought years.
Column 3 of Table 4 interacts local soil suitability for potato cultivation with century
dummies.19 The results for conflict exposure are again similar as before.
5.1.4 Ruggedness
Hohenberg and Lees (1995) note that, for defensive purposes, city locations were often in
difficult-to-reach places. Column 4 of Table 4 interacts local terrain ruggedness, another
geographical feature from Bosker et al. (2013), with century dummies. The ruggedness
data calculate the standard deviation of the elevation of the terrain that surrounds each
sample city for a radius of 10 km. The estimate for conflict exposure is robust to the
inclusion of ruggedness-century interaction effects.
17These data are available for grid cells of roughly 55 km x 40 km. Bosker et al. match the soil quality data
to cities based on latitudes and longitudes.
18Andersen et al. (2015) provide data on soil suitability for a plow-positive crop (barley) for NUTS2 units,
which we match to sample cities in our database. We test three levels of barley suitability: (i) high, where
Andersen et al.’s suitability index exceeds 70, (ii) good, where this index exceeds 55, and (iii) medium,
where this index exceeds 40. Table A14 of the online appendix shows the results when we interact soil
suitability for barley with century fixed effects for the most stringent specification (i.e., column 4 of Table
3). The estimates for Ci,g,t−1 range from 0.069 to 0.072, with p-values that range from 0.034 to 0.045.
19To construct the potato suitability data, we follow the Nunn-Qian procedure. First, we match the GIS
raster file with global coverage of soil suitability for potato cultivation to each 150 km x 150 km grid cell
in our database. There are five categories of potato suitability: (i) very suitable land, (ii) suitable land, (iii)
moderately suitable land, (iv) marginally suitable land, and (v) unsuitable land. Nunn and Qian define
land to be suitable for potato cultivation if it falls within categories (i) to (iii). Finally, we define potato
suitability as Potatoi,g ≡ ln(1 + PotatoAreai,g).
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5.1.5 Other Geographic Features
The local returns to time-invariant geographical features may change over time. For ex-
ample, improvements to maritime technology may have changed the returns to sea or
river locations. Column 5 of Table 4 interacts the variables from columns 1 to 4 (Atlantic
ports, soil quality, soil suitability for potato cultivation, and ruggedness) along with a va-
riety of other local geographic characteristics (seaports, riverports, Roman road hubs, and
elevations above sea level) with century fixed effects.20 The result for conflict exposure is
similar in magnitude and significance as before.
5.1.6 Time-Varying City-Level Features
Distances to other cities may influence urbanization patterns. City fixed effects control
for distances between cities. Grid-cell specific trends help control for changes in urban
networks and transportation technology over time. As an additional way to account for
urban clusters, we control for the number of cities with populations of at least 10,000 that
were located within 100 km of each sample city per century. To account for political insti-
tutions, we include a dummy variable for whether a city was a self-governing commune
each century. To account for education, we include a dummy variable for whether a city
hosted a university each century. To account for religion, we control for whether a city
was a bishop or archbishop seat each century. We code the city-level variables according
to Bosker et al. (2013).21
Column 6 of Table 4 adds these time-varying city-level controls. The estimate for
Ci,g,t−1 remains significant; the point estimate falls to 5 percent. Dense urban networks
and self-governing communes were associated with significant increases in city popula-
tions.
Column 7 of Table 4 includes the interaction terms from columns 1 to 5 (Atlantic ports,
soil quality, soil suitability for potato cultivation, ruggedness, and local geography) along
with the city-level controls. The estimate for conflict exposure is similar in magnitude
and significance to the previous specification.
20The data for the other geographic variables are from Bosker et al. (2013).
21Note that these variables are “bad” controls (Angrist and Pischke, 2009) in the sense that they themselves
may be outcomes of military conflict.
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5.2 Placebo Tests
To this point, we have shown evidence for a robust relationship that runs from conflict
exposure to city population growth. To further test the strength of this relationship, we
create a conflict exposure placebo equal to the first lead of our exposure measure. For
example, if the dependent variable Pi,g,t measures log population for city i in grid cell
g in 1500, then the conflict exposure placebo measures conflict exposure over 1500-1599
(in contrast to the original conflict exposure measure Ci,g,t−1, which measures conflict
exposure over 1400-1499). If the placebo coefficient is not significant, then this analysis
will provide further evidence in favor of our preferred interpretation of the results.
Column 1 of Table 5 shows the result for the one-century conflict exposure placebo
for the most stringent specification. The point estimate for the conflict exposure placebo
is 0.036; the p-value is 0.281. For comparison, if we estimate this specification for the
original conflict exposure measure for the same set of observations as for the placebo
sample, the point estimate (0.072) is twice the size of the placebo estimate and is highly
significant (not shown).
Column 2 shows the result when we exclude the capital city and largest city today for
each sample country. The point estimate for the conflict exposure placebo is now 0.027;
the p-value is 0.423. Excluding the largest 10 sample cities (column 3) or 20 sample cities
(column 4) each century between 800 and 1800 does not change the placebo test results,
either.
Glaeser and Shapiro (2002, p. 211) note that a target effect was less likely if a city had
the military strength to protect its wealth. Column 5 shows the result when we restrict
the sample to cities that were ever self-governing communes, where military strength was
likely to have been greater (Shultz and Weingast, 1998, Stasavage, 2011). Consistent with
Glaeser and Shapiro’s claim, the point estimate for the conflict exposure placebo falls to
0.010; the p-value rises to 0.789.
Overall, the placebo tests reinforce our preferred interpretation of the results.
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5.3 Target Effect Test
We control for demographic trends in several ways (e.g., country-century interaction ef-
fects, grid-cell specific trends, initial log city population-century interaction effects). To
explicitly test for the target effect, we regress the conflict exposure measure Ci,g,t−1 on
lagged city populations. For example, if the dependent variable Ci,g,t−1 measures conflict
exposure over 1400-1499, then Pi,g,t−1 measures lagged log city populations in 1400. This
test is a way to evaluate whether larger cities are more attractive targets. Column 1 of
Table 6 shows the results of this analysis for the most stringent specification when the in-
dependent variable is Pi,g,t−1. Column 2 repeats this test when the independent variables
are Pi,g,t−1 and Pi,g,t−2. The coefficients for lagged city populations are not significant in
either specification. Columns 3 to 6 show the results when we exclude (i) the capital city
and largest city today for each sample country (column 3), (ii) the largest 10 sample cities
each century (column 4), (iii) the largest 20 sample cities each century (column 5), or (iv)
non self-governing communes (column 6). Relative to the first two columns, the coeffi-
cients for lagged city populations are smaller and the p-values are larger in columns 3, 4,
and 6, and of similar size in column 5.22 This exercise provides further evidence that the
target effect does not drive our results.23
22To test whether larger cities were more attractive targets over the short term, Table A12 of the online
appendix shows the results of the target effect test when we regress the conflict exposure measure Ci,g,t−1
on lagged city populations Pi,g,t−1, where Ci,g,t−1 now equals 1 if there was a military conflict in grid
cell g over the first z years of century t, where z = 10, 20, 30, 40, 50. The coefficients for Pi,g,t−1 are never
significant.
23In the online appendix, we account for the target effect in another way, by including the lagged dependent
variable and re-running the specifications from Table 3. Including the lagged dependent variable induces
Nickell bias (Nickell, 1981), particularly if the panel’s time dimension T is small (for our sample, T = 8).
Still, Table A6 shows the main results when we include lagged log city population as a control. The
estimates for Ci,g,t−1 range from 0.048 to 0.080, with p-values that range from 0.005 to 0.140 (we lose
20 percent of observations). For comparison, the original estimates range from 0.063 to 0.113, with p-
values that range from 0.004 to 0.055. Thus, including lagged log city population does not change the
main results by much. To address Nickell bias, we can use GMM estimation (Arellano and Bond, 1991).
However, GMM requires strong assumptions (Angrist and Pischke, 2009, p. 245). Namely, GMM uses
past differenced lags to instrument for the lagged dependent variable; it is unlikely that past differenced
lags are not correlated with the differenced residuals. Still, Table A13 shows the main results when we use
GMM. The estimates for Ci,g,t−1 range from 0.024 to 0.062, with p-values that range from 0.013 to 0.321




Country-century interaction effects and grid-cell specific trends control for unobserved
time-varying factors at the national and local levels, respectively. To further control for
the influence of early industrialization, column 1 of Table 7 excludes British (along with
Irish) cities for the most stringent specification. The results for conflict exposure are robust
to this sample change.24
5.4.2 Exclude Capitals
To test for the importance of capital status, column 2 of Table 7 excludes grid cell-centuries
that contain a historical sovereign capital city according to Bosker et al. (2013). The es-
timate for Ci,g,t−1 remains significant at the 1 percent level, with a point estimate of 11
percent.25
5.4.3 Exclude Centuries
The 1700s saw over 35 percent of all sample conflicts. To further test – beyond century
fixed effects – the influence of eighteenth-century conflicts, column 3 of Table 7 restricts
the sample to conflicts from 800 to 1699. The estimate for conflict exposure on city popu-
lations is similar as before.
Scholars including Tilly (1992), Parker (1996), and Gennaioli and Voth (2014) focus on
the early modern era (from the fifteenth century onward) as a particularly important era
of military conflict and state-building in Europe. Column 4 of Table 7 shows the result for
this era. The estimate for Ci,g,t−1 remains robust.26
24Figure A1 of the online appendix shows the results for the most stringent specification (i.e., column 4 of
Table 3) when we exclude each country one by one (there are 26 countries). The estimates for Ci,g,t−1 range
from 0.044 to 0.077, with p-values that range from 0.014 to 0.098 (24 of 26 p-values are less than 0.050). The
lowest point estimate (0.044) occurs when we exclude Spain. Still, this estimate remains significant at the
10 percent level. Over the medieval period, Christian rulers expelled Muslim invaders from Spain (the
Reconquista). To defend newly recaptured territory, such rulers established fortified cities. To promote
repopulation, they often granted individual freedoms to new urban inhabitants (O’Callaghan, 2002, pp.
699-700).
25Furthermore, excluding the capital city and largest city today for each sample country does not change
the main results.
26The estimate for conflict exposure is positive but no longer significant when we restrict the conflict sample
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5.5 Alternative Conflict Exposure Measure
Our benchmark measure for conflict exposure is a dummy variable. As described in
Section 3, the dummy approach makes sense because 90 percent of grid cell-centuries
saw 0 or 1 conflicts from 800 to 1799. 95 percent of grid cell-centuries saw 0, 1, or 2
conflicts from 800 to 1799. Thus, as an alternative, we construct an ordered variable that
takes a value of 0 for each century that a grid cell saw 0 conflicts, a value of 1 for 1 conflict,
and a value of 2 for 2 or more conflicts. Table 8 shows the results for the ordered variable
approach. The results are robust to this alternative conflict exposure measure.27
5.6 Summary
Overall, the robustness checks described in this section reinforce the validity of our main
result, namely that there is a strong and significant relationship that runs from conflict
exposure to city population growth in European history.
to the pre-early modern era (e.g., column 4 of Table A5 of the online appendix). Tilly (1992), Parker (1996),
and Gennaioli and Voth (2014) highlight the importance of new urban fortifications in early modern Eu-
rope called the trace italienne. New fortifications may have reduced the probability of wartime urban
destruction. For example, Bosker et al. (2013) provide data for the number of times that a sample city was
plundered each century. Between the start of the ninth century and the end of the twelfth century, sample
cities were plundered 105 times. However, between the start of the fifteenth century and the end of the
eighteenth century, sample cities were only plundered 65 times. Furthermore, the most plundering (61
times) took place over the ninth century, while the least plundering (5 times) took place over the eigh-
teenth century. This evidence suggests that post-fifteenth century improvements in defensive structures
may have reduced the likelihood of wartime urban destruction, which may help explain why our results
suggest that the safe harbor effect was more important during the early modern era than before. A related
explanation is that the safe harbor effect may have become more important after the Black Death and the
emergence of a post-Malthusian economy. Greater per capita income translated into greater tax revenues,
which (i) increased the likelihood of military conflict (Voigtla¨nder and Voth, 2013a,b) and (ii) may have
increased the ability of polities to construct new fortifications, thereby reducing the likelihood of wartime
urban destruction. This explanation is consistent with the result in column 5 of Table 5, which shows that
a target effect was less likely if a city had the military strength to protect its wealth.
27Table A10 of the online appendix shows the result for the most stringent specification (i.e., column 4
of Table 3) when we use the number of conflicts and the squared number of conflicts as our variables of
interest. The estimate for Ci,g,t−1 is 0.023, with p-value 0.051. The estimate for the quadratic term is -0.001,
with p-value 0.118. The coefficient for the quadratic term is negative. However, (i) the magnitude is very
small and (ii) the negative effect does not apply until 12 conflicts are reached. This number is large; nearly
all sample cities were exposed to less conflict over 800-1799.
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6 Further Evidence
In this section, we present further evidence for the safe harbor effect. This evidence takes
two forms. First, we distinguish between conflict types. Second, we offer evidence from
the historical literature on city walls.
6.1 Conflict Types
Battles and sieges comprise 94 percent of our historical conflict data. Battles typically
took place in the countryside or hinterland, whereas sieges typically took place just out-
side (and sometimes within) cities. Table 9 restricts the conflict sample to battles only
(column 1) or sieges only (column 2) for the most stringent specification. For battles only,
the estimate for Ci,g,t−1 is highly significant, with a point estimate of 0.065. For sieges only,
however, the estimate for Ci,g,t−1 is not significant, with a smaller point estimate (0.034).
We believe that this evidence on conflict types is consistent with the safe harbor effect, be-
cause it suggests that, as our argument would predict, the safe harbor effect was stronger
for conflicts that took place in the countryside or hinterland than for conflicts that took
place just outside cities, which could cause greater urban destruction (and therefore less
city population growth).
6.2 Evidence from City Walls
Fortified stone walls did not surround every city in medieval and early modern Europe
(Tracy, 2000a, pp. 3-4, Tracy, 2000b, p. 77).28 For example, Tracy (2000b, table 3.7) esti-
mates that 576 of 1,083 (or, 53 percent) of cities in Germany were walled between Roman
times and 1800.29 The cost to erect fortified stone walls in terms of labor and materials
was large (Tracy, 2000a, p. 3). For example, the basic fourteenth-century wall at Leiden in
the Netherlands took 50 million bricks to build (Tracy, 2000b, p. 71). Fourteenth-century
Lille, which Wolfe (2009, p. 65) labels a “typical” French case, spent 50 percent of yearly
revenues on construction and maintenance costs for its city walls. Tracy (2000a,b) ar-
28As described in Section 2, a city without fortified walls could still have outer rings of conjoined dwellings
that functioned as barriers, or could have defensive palisades or ramparts, or be situated in a naturally
protected location, thereby enabling small groups of defenders to fend off larger groups of attackers.
29Tracy’s definition of “walled city” counts single or double stone walls, gun platforms placed outside of
walls, and bastioned traces, but excludes defensive palisades and ramparts.
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gues that improved security was the main reason why some city leaders decided to pay
the price and erect fortified walls, writing (p. 3): “No matter how ’natural’ it may have
seemed for a town to have walls, the sheer labor and expense involved means that wall
builders must have had compelling reasons. Most often, it was a matter of defense against
anticipated attack.” Reyerson (2000, p. 89) and Wolfe (2009, p. 60-1) claim that the begin-
ning of the Hundred Years’ War (1337-1453) was associated with significant wall-building
efforts by French cities. Similarly, Wolfe (2000, p. 328) argues that the start of the French
Wars of Religion (1562-98) began a “frenzy” of wall-building activity.
It is difficult to systematically assess which cities were walled in medieval and early
modern Europe (Tracy, 2000b, p. 77). Germany is the best documented case (Tracy, 2000b,
p. 77). Tracy (2000b, table 3.7) estimates the share of walled cities in total cities for histor-
ical German provinces. We combine the Tracy data on walled cities with data on conflict
exposure between 800 and 1799 according to modern German states, which overlap with
historical provinces.30 To compute our measure of conflict exposure, we sum the num-
ber of conflicts within each modern German state over this period. We then scale this
number by the area of each modern German state. Figure 2 indicates that there is a pos-
itive relationship between warfare and walled cities in German history. Rhineland, the
province with the most historical conflict exposure (0.55), has the second-highest share of
walled cities (51 out of 73, or 70 percent). By contrast, Saxony and Schleswig-Holstein,
the provinces with the least historical conflict exposure, have the lowest shares of walled
cities. This evidence suggests that, as the safe harbor effect would predict, the historical
relationship between warfare and city walls is positive. Furthermore, Tracy (2000b, ta-
bles 3.4-3.6) shows that the percentage of walled cities was relatively high (35-43 percent)
among very small cities (less than 1,000 inhabitants), which suggests that security was a
main function of city walls, even if there was not much wealth to protect.
Overall, while we still cannot rule out the roles of the rural poverty effect or the
Malthusian effect to explain the historical relationship between military conflict and city
30The mappings from historical provinces to modern German states are approximations. Tracy presents
data for eleven historical provinces, of which we exclude two (East Prussia and Silesia) that do not fall
within the borders of modern Germany. Of the nine historical provinces that we include, we map Anhalt
to the modern state of Saxony-Anhalt, Brandenburg to Brandenburg, Hesse to Hesse, Meckenburg and
Pomerania to Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Rhineland to Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony (or, Old Saxony) to
Lower Saxony, Schleswig-Holstein to Schleswig-Holstein, and Thuringia to Thuringia.
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population growth, the evidence that we present in this section provides further evidence
for the safe harbor effect.
7 Conclusion
This paper presents new evidence about the relationship between military conflict and
city population growth in Europe from the fall of Charlemagne’s empire to the start of
the Industrial Revolution. Military conflict was a defining feature of European history.
Our argument follows a distinguished line of scholars that view historical cities as safe
harbors from conflict threats.
To test our argument, we perform an econometric analysis on a novel database that
spans 1,000 years. Our analysis accounts for potential biases from omitted variables and
reverse causation. We show evidence for a positive, significant, and robust relationship
that runs from conflict exposure to city population growth. Our estimates indicate that
conflict exposure was associated with a 6-11 percent average increase in city populations.
To the best of our knowledge, our paper is among the first to provide systematic evi-
dence that military conflicts played a key role in the rise of urban Europe. Does the legacy
of historical conflict persist? Systematic study of the long-run consequences of historical
conflict for urban prosperity in Europe is an exciting topic for future work.
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Table 1: Military Conflicts Comprising the Thirty Years’ War
Conflict Name Year Nearest Settlement Country
1 Sablat 1619 Budweis Czech Rep
2 White Hill 1620 Prague Czech Rep
3 Fleurus 1622 Fleurus Belgium
4 Hochst 1622 Frankfurt am Main Germany
5 Wimpfen 1622 Bad Wimpfen Germany
6 Stadtlohn 1623 Stadtlohn Germany
7 Breda 1624 Breda Netherlands
8 Bridge of Dessau 1625 Dessau Germany
9 Lutter 1626 Lutter am Barenberge Germany
10 Stralsund 1626 Stralsund Germany
11 Wolgast 1628 Wolgast Germany
12 Madgeburg 1630-1 Madgeburg Germany
13 Breitenfeld 1631 Leipzig Germany
14 Frankfurt (Oder) 1631 Frankfurt (Oder) Germany
15 Werben 1631 Werben (Elbe) Germany
16 Lu¨tzen 1632 Lu¨tzen Germany
17 Nuremberg 1632 Nuremberg Germany
18 River Lech 1632 Rain Germany
19 Nordlingen 1634 Nordlingen Germany
20 Tornavento 1636 Oleggio Italy
21 Wittstock 1636 Wittstock Germany
22 Breda 1637 Breda Netherlands
23 Leucate 1637 Leucate France
24 Breisach 1638 Breisach Germany
25 Fuenterrabia 1638 Hondarribia Spain
26 Rheinfelden 1638 Rheinfelden Switzerland
27 Casale 1640 Casale Monferrato Italy
28 2nd Breitenfeld 1642 Leipzig Germany
29 Le´rida 1642 Le´rida Spain
30 Rocroi 1643 Rocroi France
31 Freiburg 1644 Freiburg im Breisgau Germany
32 Allerheim 1645 Allerheim Germany
33 Jankau 1645 Jankov Czech Rep
34 Mergentheim 1645 Bad Mergentheim Germany
35 Le´rida 1647 Le´rida Spain
36 Lens 1648 Lens France
37 Zusmarshausen 1648 Zusmarshausen Germany
Source: Clodfelter (2002).
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Table 2: Military Conflicts, 800-1799
800s 900s 1000s 1100s 1200s 1300s 1400s 1500s 1600s 1700s
No of conflicts 26 15 50 35 29 51 72 117 157 295
City share 0.12 0.09 0.27 0.14 0.19 0.20 0.29 0.39 0.45 0.54
Grid cell share 0.08 0.06 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.15 0.18 0.28 0.35 0.43
Sources: Bradbury (2004) for 800-1499 and Clodfelter (2002) for 1500-1799.
Note: Land-based conflicts in Europe. City share is share of sample cities that saw (at least one)
conflict by century. Grid cell share is share of sample grid cells that saw (at least one) conflict by
century. See Section 3 for further details.
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Table 3: Military Conflict and City Population Growth: Main Results
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep var is log city population
Conflict exposure 0.113*** 0.112*** 0.063* 0.067**
(0.039) (0.038) (0.033) (0.031)
[0.004] [0.004] [0.055] [0.031]
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Century FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x century FE No Yes Yes Yes
Grid cell time trends No No Yes Yes
Initial log city pop x century FE No No No Yes
R-squared 0.250 0.409 0.578 0.655
Observations 3,416 3,416 3,416 3,416
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All regressions include city and century
fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at grid cell level in paren-
theses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 4: Military Conflict and City Population Growth: Controls for Observables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Dependent variable is log city population
Conflict exposure 0.073** 0.066** 0.062** 0.067** 0.062** 0.051* 0.045*
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031) (0.027) (0.029) (0.026)
[0.016] [0.033] [0.036] [0.030] [0.022] [0.080] [0.082]
Atlantic port x century FE Yes No No No Yes No Yes
Soil quality x century FE No Yes No No Yes No Yes
Potato suitability x century FE No No Yes No Yes No Yes
Ruggedness x century FE No No No Yes Yes No Yes
Local geography x century FE No No No No Yes No Yes
City-level controls No No No No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.664 0.657 0.657 0.656 0.685 0.663 0.692
Observations 3,416 3,416 3,416 3,416 3,416 3,416 3,416
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All regressions include city and century fixed effects, country-
century interaction effects, grid-cell specific trends, and initial log city population-century interaction
effects. Local geographic controls for seaports, riverports, Roman road hubs, and elevations above
sea level. City-level controls for urban networks and centuries for which cities were self-governing
communes, university hosts, or bishop or archbishop seats. Robust standard errors clustered at grid
cell level in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 5: Military Conflict and City Pop Growth: Placebos
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep var is log city population
Future conflict exposure 0.036 0.027 0.024 0.037 0.010
(100-yr placebo) (0.034) (0.034) (0.036) (0.031) (0.036)
[0.281] [0.419] [0.502] [0.238] [0.789]
Exclude capital city, largest city today No Yes No No No
Exclude 10 largest cities per century No No Yes No No
Exclude 20 largest cities per century No No No Yes No
Include self-governing communes only No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.603 0.591 0.607 0.617 0.640
Observations 2,743 2,594 2,647 2,548 1,885
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All regressions include city and century fixed ef-
fects, country-century interaction effects, grid-cell specific trends, and initial log city
population-century interaction effects. Robust standard errors clustered at grid cell
level in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 6: Military Conflict and City Pop Growth: Target Effect
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep var is conflict exposure
Log city population (first lag) 0.027 0.039 0.022 0.021 0.030 0.008
(0.025) (0.031) (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) (0.029)
[0.284] [0.206] [0.421] [0.434] [0.251] [0.789]
Log city population (second lag) -0.018
(0.031)
[0.573]
Exclude capital city, largest city today No No Yes No No No
Exclude 10 largest cities per century No No No Yes No No
Exclude 20 largest cities per century No No No No Yes No
Include self-governing communes only No No No No No Yes
R-squared 0.441 0.474 0.423 0.447 0.455 0.474
Observations 2,743 2,137 2,594 2,655 2,564 1,885
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All regressions include city and century fixed effects, country-
century interaction effects, grid-cell specific trends, and initial log city population-century in-
teraction effects. Robust standard errors clustered at grid cell level in parentheses, followed by
corresponding p-values in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 7: Military Conflict and City Population Growth: Alternative Samples
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dependent variable is log city population
Exclude British cities Exclude capital grids 800-1699 sample 1400-1799 sample
Conflict exposure 0.075** 0.108*** 0.072** 0.051*
(0.031) (0.033) (0.031) (0.028)
[0.017] [0.001] [0.022] [0.072]
R-squared 0.625 0.670 0.605 0.663
Observations 3,027 2,696 2,743 2,292
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All regressions include city and century fixed effects, country-century in-
teraction effects, grid-cell specific trends, and initial log city population-century interaction effects. Robust
standard errors clustered at grid cell level in parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 8: Military Conflict and City Pop Growth: Ordered Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Dep var is log city population
Conflict exposure 0.055* 0.063** 0.038* 0.040**
(0.028) (0.025) (0.020) (0.019)
[0.053] [0.012] [0.057] [0.039]
City FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Century FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country x century FE No Yes Yes Yes
Grid cell time trends No No Yes Yes
Initial log city pop x century FE No No No Yes
R-squared 0.248 0.409 0.577 0.655
Observations 3,416 3,416 3,416 3,416
Note: Estimation method is OLS. All regressions include city and cen-
tury fixed effects. Robust standard errors clustered at grid cell level in
parentheses, followed by corresponding p-values in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Table 9: Military Conflict and City Pop Growth: Conflict Types
(1) (2)
Dep var is log city population
Battles only Sieges only





Note: Estimation method is OLS. All regressions include
city and century fixed effects, country-century interaction ef-
fects, grid-cell specific trends, and initial log city population-
century interaction effects. Robust standard errors clustered
at grid cell level in parentheses, followed by corresponding
p-values in brackets.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.10
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Note: Cylindrical equal area map projection with geometric center (longitude, latitude)=(10.00735,
46.76396). Data displayed in projection of analysis.
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Figure 2: Historical Warfare and City Walls in Germany, 800-1799
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